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SUNDAY CONTRACTS
The duty of observing Sunday by abstaining from the making of contracts on that day was not recognized by the common
law.' The invalidity of Sunday contracts in Pennsylvania, is the
result of the act of April 22nd, 1794: 4 Stewart's Purd. 4485,
which reads thus: "If any person shall do or perform any
worldly employment or business whatsoever on the Lord's day,
commonly called Sunday (works of necessity and charity only
excepted), or shall use or practice any unlawful game, hunting,
shooting, sport or diversion whatsoever on the same day, and be
convicted thereof, every such person so offending shall, for every
such offense, forfeit and pay four dollars, to be levied by distress,
or in case he or she shall refuse or neglect to pay the said sum,
or goods and chattels cannot be found, whereof to levy the same
by distress, he or she shall suffer six days' imprisonment, in the
house of correction of the prctper county, Provided always, that
nothing herein contained shall be construed to prohibit the dressing of victuals in private families, bake-houses, lodging-houses,
inns and other houses of entertainment, for the use of sojourners,
travellers or strangers, or to hinder watermen from landing their
passengers, or ferrymen from carrying over the water travellers,
or persons removing with their families on the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday, nor to the delivery of milk, or the necessaries of life, before nine of the clock in the forenoon, nor after
five of the o'clock in the afternoon of the same day."
'Kepner v. Keefer, 6 W. 231; Fox v. Mensch,3 W. & S. 444. Morgan
v. Richards, 1 Bro. 171, saying that a contract made on Sunday is void,
is erroneous, 6 W. 231.
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ILLEGALITY OF CONTRACTS

From the prohibition of the doing or performing of any
worldly employment or business, is derived that of the making of
contracts, and from the prohibition of the making of contracts,
is derived the voidness of contracts made in defiance of it.
EFFECT OF ILLEGALITY

A sharp distinction is drawn between an executory contract,
and one which the parties have performed. When a'Sunday contract is once performed its effects are as unchangeable as those of
a contract not tainted with any illegality. The contract may be
performed on one side. The performee will have the same
rights thereunder, as if the contract had been valid. Thus, a
deed, delivered on Sunday to the grantee. vests the estate in
him, and will not be avoided by the courts. 2 Distinguishing between executory and executed contracts, Woodward, j., says:
"If two men agree on Sunday to exchange horses, their conduct
so far as respects any legal remedies is void, but, if they make the
exchange, in pursuance of their agreement, will the law compel
them to trade back? The answer to these questions is obvious.
A contract not void at common law, nor expressly avoided by any
statute, and which has been fully executed by the parties, binds
them, although it was made on Sunday." A sale of mules was
made on Sunday; they were on that day delivered to the vendee,
who gave a promissory note for the price of them. They became
the vendee's, and could not be attached, three days later, under
the act of March 17th, 1869, by the vendor's creditors. 3 A lease
being assigned on Sunday, Trexler, J., refused tolannul the assignment, saying that a consideration passed for it, and as between the
parties, nothingremained to be done on the part ofthe assignee;4 that
is, probably, if the consummated assignment would have been upheld, had it not been made on Sunday, it will be sustained, although made on Sunday. A release of a mechanics' lien operates
simultaneously with its delivery. Hence a release delivered on
Sunday, will preclude the assertion of the lien against the premises. 5
2
Shuman v. Shuman, 27 Pa. 90. Probably nothing remained to be
done by the grantee.
3
Chestnut v. Harbaugh, 78 Pa. 473.
4
Dobbins v. Mackinnon, 3 Leh. Val. 25.
5
Steyert's Estate, 10 Montg. 75.
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ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AS EXECUTION OF CONTRACT

There are cases which treat a contract to pay money,e. g., a
bond0 or a note, 7 with warrant to confess judgment as executed
by the entry of a judgment thereon, and which, for this reason.
refuse to strike off or open the judgment, the alleged ground for
doing which is the fact that the bond or note was delivered on
Sunday. "Judgment was regularly entered on the warrant of
attorney, says Read, J., "and it thus became a contract executed.
* * * We have refused to interfere with executed contracts."" If, however, several reasons for opening a judgment
on a note are alleged, e. g., the forgery of the name of the defendant, and the execution of the note on Sunday, and the court
opens the judgment generally, awarding an issue, instead of
limiting the inquiry to the forgery, the defendant may treat the
note precisely as if a suit had been brought upon it. 9 The fact
that a judgment note and a fi fa are delivered to the prothonotary
on Sunday does not vitiate the judgment which he enters and
the execution, which he issues thereon on the following day.1 0
JUDGMENT NOT AN EXECUTION OF CONTRACT
Despite the effort of Read, J., to persuade himself that the
entry of a judgment on a bond or note containing a warrant of
attorney is an execution of the contract, it is very clear that it
has no similitude with such execution. A party executes a contract as to him when he does that which it obligates him to do.
When a man gives a note with a warrant, the person who causes
the judgment to be entered is not he, but the plaintiff. The entry
of the judgment is not a performance of the contract, but a step
in the process of compelling performance. Fell, J., remarks.
"The entering of judgment by confession did not make the contract to pay, of which the note was evidence, an executed contract. The agreement to confess judgment only was executed." 1 "
6

Baker v. Lukens, 35 Pa. 146.
.
Lee v. Drake, 10 C. C. 276; Chambers v. Brew, 18 C. C. 399; Thomas
v. Van Dyke, 23 C. C. 385; Hodgson v. Nesbit, 25 C. C. 78.
8
Baker v. Lukens, 35 Pa. 146.
9
Whitmore v. Montgomery, 165 Pa. 253.
1
iKauffman's Appeal, 70 Pa. 261.
iiWhitmore v. Montgomery, 165 Pa. 253.
7
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When the courts adopt the policy of not opening a judgment,
in order to allow the defense that the bond or note was executed
on Sunday, they adopt a policy having no similarity to that of
refusing to reverse the performance by the parties of their own
Sunday contracts.
CONTRACT MUST BE COMPLETED ON SUNDAY

Parties may negotiate with a view to contracting, and the
negotiation may end in a contract. The fact that the negotiation
was in whole or in part conducted on Sunday, will not vitiate the
resulting contract which is concluded on a secular day. A sale of
15 mules was negotiated for on Sunday, and 13 were then. delivered and a note for the whole fifteen given to the vendor. Two
others were secured by the vendor the next day, and delivered to
the vendee. The sale of the two could be treated as made on the
week day and the price of them recovered. 1 2 In Curtin v. Gas
Company' 8 there was a sale of a boiler, engine, etc., and an action
for the price. The court concludes from the evidence that the
negotiations commenced on Nov. 9th, which was Saturday, continued on the next day, but were not finished until the delivery
of the possession on Monday, Nov. 18th. Therefore the price
could be recovered.
WHEN CONTRACT IS COMPLETED
A contract represented by a deed, bond, promissory note, is
not consummated by the writing of it, nor even by the signing of
it, but by its delivery to the person, or the agent of the person, towards whom the obligation is assumed. Hence, writing it, or
signing it, 1 4 on Sunday, does not vitiate it, if it is delivered on a
secular day. An official bond of a justice of the peace is delivered
to the prothonotary and filed on Monday. It is a Monday contract, although negotiations for the signing of it by the surety
began on Saturday, and it was signed by him on Sunday.' 5
1 2 Foreman v. Ahl, 55 Pa. 325. There could be no recovery on the note
for the other thirteen.
13233 Pa. 397.
' 4 Stevens v. Hallock, 7 Kulp, 260; Breitenman's Appeal, 55 Pa. 183.
15 Comm. v. Kendig, 2 Pa. 448.
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REPETITION OF CONTRACT

A contract may be made between A and B on Sunday
for the doing of an act by B at a future time; and the doing
thereupon, of an act by A. Although this contract is not enforceable if B does the act, in which A co-operates, a new contract may be considered as arising, whereby A obliges himself
to do the act which he originally undertook to do. B with C, his
surety, owed A a debt of $1000, payable April 2nd, 1851. In
March, 1852, on a Sunday, A and B agreed, C not agreeing, that
if B would pay $160 on April 1st, 1852 (one day before any part
of the debt fell due), A would give him a year's time for the payment of the balance of the debt. B made the payment on April
1st (a week day), which was received by A. Says Lewis, C. J.,
"When that payment was made by the one party (B) and accepted by the other (A) upon the terms perfectly understood by
both, it constituted a perfect contract upon a valid consideration
free from any objection arising from the previous conversation
on Sunday. It was a new contract, which the plaintiff was bound
to perform." Hence, A having disabled himself from suing B, C,
as surety, was discharged. 6
SORTS OF CONTRACTS

The principle that contracts made on Sunday in violation of
the act of 1794 are not enforceable is applicable to a variety of
contracts; to a bet, made on Sunday,(the winner could not recover) 17 to a warranty of a horse, given by the seller; 1 8 to a
guaranty of the payment of rent, to become due under a lease;19
to the contract of suretyship, that a vendor of lumber will deliver it; 20 or that the vendee of goods will pay the price, 21 to a
single bill ;22 to a bond ;23 to a promissory note ;24 to a subscrip'(Uhler v. Applegate, 26 Pa. 140.
17Morgan v. Richards, I Bro. 171. Even though made on a week
day, the bet could not have been enforced.
18 Thomas v. Van Dyke, 23 C. C. 385.
19Miley v. Wildermuth, 4 W. N. 560.
20
Sherman v. Roberts, 1 Gr. "261.
21
Stevens v. Hallock, 7 Kulp 260.
22
Kepner v. Keefer, 6 W. 231.
23Fox v. Mensch, 3 W. & S. 444; Baker v. Lukens, 35 Pa. 146;

Stevens
v. Hallock, 7 Kulp 260.
24

Foreman v. Ahl, 55 Pa. 325 ; Whitmore v. Montgomery, 165 Pa. 253;
Lee v. Drake, 10 C. C. 276.
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tion towards the erection of a building, etc., unless the erection,
being for a charity, such as a church, the act falls within the exception mentioned in the act of 1794.25 A contract to give time
to a principal debtor, made on Sunday, would not preclude the
creditor from ignoring it, and compelling payment at the time
originally designated; and hence would not discharge the nonassenting surety. 2 6 The acknowledgement of or promise to pay
27
a debt, made on Sunday, will not toll the statute of limitation,
and suit for goods sold cannot be sustained by no other proof of
the sale, than that of an exhibition of an account (purporting to
be of the sale) to the alleged vendee on a Sunday, and of his
2
promise, then made, to pay.
IGNORANCE OF PLAINTIFF THAT CONTRACT WAS
8

MADE ON SUNDAY

Perhaps, if a contract of suretyship, endorsed on the primary
contract is entered into on Sunday, and delivered to the principal,
in order that he may deliver it to the creditor, and the principal
delivers it to the creditor on a week day, who has no knowledge
that it was signed by the surety on Sunday, it can be enforced.
"The execution of the instrument on Sunday," charged White,
J., "did not avoid it, unless it was delivered to Roberts [the creditor] on Sunday, or he had knowledge of the fact of its execution
' 29
on Sunday."
OFFICIAL BONDS

Probably the execution of a bond to secure the proper performance of the duties of an officer, e. g., a justice of the peace,
although a violation of the act of 1794, which will expose those
who make it to the penalties prescribed by that act, will not make
the bond void, as against those who are interested in enforcing
it. His official bond was brought by the justice who had previously signed it to the house of the surety, who signed. it on
Sunday. It was received and filed by the prothonotary on a
later, secular, day. When suit on the bond against the justice
25
Dale
2

v. Knepp, 98 Pa. 389.
GUhler v. Applegate, 26 Pa. 140.

27

Linn's Estate, 2 Pears. 487.

28

Haydock v. Tracy, 3 W. & S. 507.
Sherman v. Roberts, 1 Gr. 261.

29
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and his surety was brought, it was held that the bond did not exist till delivery; "but, granting that the bond was signed and delivered on Sunday, yet," says Rogers, J.,"I am by no means satisfied that it was void, as against those who are injured by the official misconduct of the justice. They are innocent parties, and
ought not to be affected by the folly or turpitude of the prothonotary and obligors. Such a construction of the act [of
1794] would enable. the obligors to take advantage of their own
wrong,.as against persons who cannot by any possibility, protect
themselves. When both parties are in default, as in the cases
ruled, there is a propriety in holding the bond void. * * * It [the
bond] may be executed on Sunday by design for the express purpose of shielding themselves (the obligors) from responsibility
80
in case of necessity, aid thus enable them to commit a fraud."
A bond for costs arising from the contest of a will, was presented
by the caveator to the register of wills, who approved it. The
bond was signed on Sunday, but was not delivered until four
days afterwards, and no notice was given to the register or to
those for whose benefit the bond was given, that it was signed
on Sunday. The surety cannot be permitted to escape liability,
after the bond has been accepted in good faith. 8 1
RATIFICATION

The opinion was expressed by Sittser, J., that a contract
32
made on sunday was "void, and incapable of ratification."
This, however, is not the accepted view. The recognition, on
a secular day, of the.existence of the debt, seems to validate the
contract out of which it grew. A note made on Sunday, March
3rd, 1889, was partially paid on March 3rd, 1890, a secular day.
The trial judge informed the jury without error, "If a man makes
a note on Sunday and delivers it [on Sunday], and it is not executed [meaning, if judgment is not entered upon the warrant of

attorney to confess judgment], it cannot be collected, unless
the man who makes the note does something to approve it. If
on Monday morning he says, I will pay it as soon as I can, he
[the holder] can collect it. If a man [the maker] goes around
S0 Comm. v. Kendig, 2 Pa. 448.
31
Middleton's Estate, 4 Del. 61.
32
Lee v. Drake. 10 C. C. 276.
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and pays the interest, that is a ratification." 33 "An agreement,
made on Sunday, that if a debtor will pay a part of the debt on
a certain future day, the creditor will extend the time for the payment of the balance, is made enforceable by the debtor on his
subsequently making the partial payment, and the creditor's re'' 4
ceiving it.
3

However, in Foreman v. Ahl 3 5 the thought that

the Sunday sale of 15 mules was ratified by the vendee by the delivery to him and by his acceptance of two of the mules on Monday, in fulfillment of the contract, did not enter the consciousness
of counsel or court. An illogical application of the principle of
ratification appears in Cook v. Forker. 36 Cook discounted a
promissory note, on which Forker was the last endorser. Instead
of paying the money to Forker, he gave to Forker a check upon
a bank, which Forker endorsed on the same day to a company,
and which was presented to and paid by the bank on the following Friday.
Cook sued upon the endorsement, but was defeated because, though dated on Monday, Sept. 11th, it was made
on Sunday, Sept. 10th. He then sued for the money obtained by
Forker's endorsee upon the check, and for interest thereon,
not from Friday, the day of payment, but from the date of the
check, which, though given simultaneously with the receipt of
the note, Sunday, Sept. 10th, bore date Sept. llth. The court
below refused to permit a recovery, because the check was delivered on Sunday. The Supreme Court, Mitchell, J., writing the
opinion, says the trial court "properly held that there could be
no recovery on the note," but the action for the money stands on
different ground. As to it, the contract was not complete or executed on Sunday. Its object on the part of the defendant was to
obtain the money on the discounted notes before their maturity,
and it was not carried out until the money was obtained. The
check in the meantime was merely a part of the incomplete Sunday agreement, and as such, either party could have refused to
go further with it. But, when the holder presented and the
33
Whitmore v. Montgomery, 165 Pa. 253. The payment on March 3rd,
1890, was indicated by a receipt written by the maker of the note, but
signed by the holder; Cf. Cook v. Forker, 193 Pa. 461.
34
Uhler v. Applegate, 26 Pa. 140; Cf. Forker, 193 Pa. 461.
3555 Pa. 325.
36193 Pa. 461.
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plaintiff paid it, both parties ratified and reaffirmed the transaction with all its consequences. This was done on a legal day,
and made a legal and binding loan of the money." But the
transaction was the making and discounting of a note. If the
payment on Friday of the consideration for the Sunday note had
any ratifying effect, why did it not ratify the note? Suppose
the note had been delivered on Sunday, and an oral agreement
had then been made to pay the money for it on Monday. Would
the payment on Monday have been a ratification? If so, of
what? Of the payment (!) or of the note? How does it matter that instead of an oral promise to pay the money, a check was
given, upon which, on a week day, the money was obtained? If
obtaining the money on the check is a ratification, of what is it
such? Of the check (!) or of the note?
But, it is singular that the justice did not perceive that the
question before the court was not one of ratification, either of
note or check, but of repudiation of both. The desire of Cook
was to get back the consideration he had paid for a note which he
found himself to be unable to collect, because it had been made
on Sunday. If he had paid the money on Sunday, he could not
have recovered it back. The question presented by the facts was
if B pays on Friday for a note which was made to him on Sunday, and which, for that reason, is not enforceable by him, may
he recover back the money, whereas, had he paid it on Sunday,
he could not have recovered it. The question is one, not of ratification of anything, but of successful repudiation of a contract.
Discarding the logic of the case, perhaps we may use it as support
for the principle that if the consideration for a Sunday bond,
promissory note or other contract is not paid until a week day,
it may be recovered back on the discovery that the bond, note,
etc., is not enforceable. All that is said about ratification is
totally irrelevant.
UNILATERALLY EXECUTED CONTRACT

When a contract is made, which is wholly performed by one
of the parties to it, the other party having contracted by bond,
note, or otherwise, to pay money or do something else, the fact
that the contract was made, and by one party performed, and
the note, bond, etc., delivered by the other party on Sunday,

164
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while it makes void, uninforceable, the note, bond, etc., does
not avoid the rights acquired by the performance of the payee,
obligee, etc. The title vested by the performance continues inviolable despite the unenforceableness of the consideration,
or even the successful repudiation of the duty. to render it by the
act of the court. The question is presented in cases of sale of
realor personal property, e.g., a sale of mules, 37 where though the
mules were delivered and the bond for the price, on Sunday, the
title for the mules was held to have vested in the vendee. Would
if follow that the bond, note, etc., is valid? It would not. Sale
of a wagon made on Sunday. A note was given for the price
also on Sunday. 38 The title to the wagon passed to the vendee.
It would not pass back, because the note was not enforceable, or
because the vendee availed himself of its defect, by defending on
that ground. The courts will not assist either party to "enforce"
the contract, says Sittser, J., but, there is no case where they hav-e
assisted a party who has performed, to undo his performance,
because of the exemptibility, or the actual exemption of the other
party from performance. A sale of mules occurring on Sunday,
for the price of which a note was given, collection of the note
was refused, although the vendee had received, and disposed of
the mules. 3 9 The vendee of a horse, who is sued for the price,
may apparently, defend on the note given for the price, if it was
given on Sunday, although he retains the horse. 40 If A contracts to distribute newspapers 4 ' on Sunday, for a given compensation, he cannot recover the compensation, although the defendant has had the benefit of his services.
BURDEN OF PROOF

When the defense to an action on a bond, note or other contract is that it was made on Sunday, the burden of proving its
execution on Sunday, is upon the defendant.4 2 It cannot be safely inferred from the fact that a horse was delivered to its pur37

Chestnut v. Harbaugh, 78 Pa. 473.
v. Drake, 10 C. C. 276
Foreman v. Ahl, 55 Pa. 325.
40Hadley v. Snevily, 1 W. & S. 477.
41Knight v. Press Co., Lim. 227 Pa. 185.
42
Hadley v. Snevily, 1 W. & S. 477; Keck v. Heilman, 20 Montg. 105.
38
Lee
39
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chaser by another than the vendor, on Sunday, that the sale occurred on Sunday. 43 Because a Sunday contract is not void at
common law, but only in consequence of the statute of 1794, it
is said that the fact that the bond sued on was executed on Sunday must be specially pleaded, or notice must be given of the
that fact. It cannot be proved
intention to take advantage of 44
under the plea of non est factun.
SUBSEQUENT RECOGNITION.

CONTRACT TO MARRY

Subsequent recognition of a contract is similar to a ratification of it. This principle is applied in two cases to contracts to
marry in suits for breach of promise of marriage. In Markley v.
Kessering, 45 the alleged contract was made on Sunday. The
man subsequently gave the woman a silk dress for the wedding,
and bought a trunk for the wedding tour. Says the Supreme
Court "The fact that the contract of marriage was entered into on
Sunday could not avail in view especially of the evidence of subsequent recognition." The subsequent purchase of a wedding
ring, and presentation of it to the woman, was held sufficient to
46
validate a Sunday contract to marry.
HIRING A HORSE

An action of assumpsit or an action on the case, if the plaintiff declares upon the contract, for a breach of it, against the
bailee of a horse for injury to it from immoderate driving, will
fail, if the contract was made on Sunday, 47 and its making was
an act neither of necessity, nor of charity. A visit to one's
father, living in the country is the performance of a filial duty.
A contract of hiring, on Sunday, for that purpose, of a horse and
43

Hadley v Snevily, 1 W. & S. 477.
Fox v. Mensch, 3 W. & S. 444. But thinks Sittser, J., probably,
under the act of 1887, which abolishes special pleading, a special plea
that the instrument was executed on Sunday is unnecessary. Lee v.
Drake, 10 C. C. 276.
452 Penny. 187.
40
Keck v. Heilman, 20 Montg. 105.
47
Berrill v. Gibbs, Cl. 313. Not decided whether trespass ould succeed. In Berrill v. Smith, 2 Miles, 402, an action for the hire of a horse,
which was let on Sunday, for "an excursion of pleasure" was non-suited;
Cf. observation on this case, in Logan v. Matthews, 6 Pa. 417.
44
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carriage, is therefore valid. Assumpsit can be maintained for
the negligent injuring of the horse.4 8 There was no evidence
that "the journey was a trip or excursion of pleasure."
THE REAL DATE

The bond, note, contract, may bear a date other than that
of Sunday. If, nevertheless, it is proved that it was executed
on Sunday, it will be void, precisely as if it bore date. Thus, a
note dated Sept. 11th, 1893, Monday, was shown to have been
executed on the previous day. 49

It was shown that the date of

a note which was given on Sunday, June 4th, 1876, was, after
signing, altered to June 3rd, 50 and that a bond bearing date Feb.
28th, 1832, Saturday, was actually made on the next day. 5 1
CONTRACT SEPARABLE FROM NOTE, BILL, ETC.

It may be that a contract is made on a week day, which, independently of a note, bond, etc., from one of the parties, would be
enforceable by the other. That being so, the making of such
note, bond, etc., on Sunday, while no action thereon could be
maintained, would not preclude a suit on the antecedent contract.
But when there is no sufficient evidence of the conclusion of a
contract capable of being enforced, e. g, a sale of looms, before the Sunday on which a single bill is given for the price, it is
errorto allow the jury in a suit for the purchase money to find for
the plaintiff. 52
CONTRACT MADE NOT ON SUNDAY FOR
SUNDAY LABOR

The act of 1794 forbids any worldly employment or business on Sunday, works of necessity and charity excepted. A
contract made on a week day, for the performance on Sunday, of
forbidden work, is unenforceable. A contract for the driving of
48

Logan v. Matthews, 6 Pa. 417.
Cook v. Forker, 193 Pa. 416; Miley v. Wildermuth, 4 W. N. 560.
50
Lee v. Drake, 10 C. C. 276.
5
lKepner v. Keefer, 6 W. 231. But as against a payee or endorsee
having no knowledge of the fact that the note, dated on a week day, was
49

actually made on Sunday, the actual date cannot be shown.
Bank v. Furman, 4 Super. 415.
52

Waverly

Kepner v. Keefer, 6 W. 231. If the declaration was upon the bill.
there could be no recovery on the antecedent contract.
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omnibuses every day, embracing Sundays, is invalid, so far at
least as the Sundays are concerned. Hence, compensation for
the driving on Sundays cannot be recovered. 53 Nor can compensation for distributing newspapers on Sundays. 54 A contract
made in New York, for singing in Sunday concerts in that State
would not sustain a suit by the singer for compensation for singing, if the law of New York prohibited Sunday concerts. 55 Contracts by a church for the services, on Sunday, of the preacher,
the sexton, the organist, the singers, are not illegal, although
these persons may engage in such employments as a means of
livelihood. These services, thinks Mercur, J., are in furtherance
of the same great charity. 50 Probably, the hire of a domestic,
servant, part of whose duty is to drive his master to church on
Sunday, in order to save the master's soul, could be recovered by
action. 5 7 But what becomes of the soul of the servant?
THE IMPOLICY OF THE DOCTRINE

The act of 179 4 forbids certain acts, and prescribes the penalty which the law making power judges suitable. The same
penalty is substantially imposed on the same sort of act committed by any person whatsoever. But, by the adoption of the
attitude that the courts not only will not aid in the enforcement
of the contract, but will not assist the parties thereto, treating it
as void, to recover whatever they may have paid, if money, or
sold, if a chattel or land, they have increased the penalty out of
all ratio to the turpitude of the acts, and have irrationally varied
it without respect to the character of the individual. Something
could be said for the view that no change of ownership could be
wrought by a Sunday sale, so that, while not permitting to the
vendor a recovery of the price, the vendee would also be prevented from retaining, without payment, the land or chattel, or
other things which was the subject of the contract. To allow
the vendee in a Sunday contract, to retain the thing which he
has bought, while denying to the vendor the right to collect the
3
5S
Johnston v. Comm. 22 Pa. 102.
5'Knight v. Press Co. Lim., 227 Pa. 185.

55

Zenatello v. Hammerstein, 231 Pa. 56.
5ODale v. Knepp, 98 Pa. 389.
7

5 Comm. v. Nesbit, 34 Pa. 398.
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price, or to allow the vendor, who has been paid, to retain the
price, without being compelled to deliver the thing, is to perpetrate a gross fraud under the pretense of upholding the sanctity of a
day. Occasionally the judges speak of the prohibition of worldly
employment or business as divine as well as human.58 It is well,
however, to remember the wise words of Huston, J., "Zeal for
religious observance of the Sabbath is commendable, but it may
exhibit itself in a very questionable shape. It cannot avail a defendant who has the possession of property without paying for it,
unless he proves that the plaintiff (the vendor) has violated some
law human or divine;" 59 but it is somewhat odd to vindicate the
law, "remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy," by enabling a
man to defraud his fellowman.
58
59

Wordward, 3., Ah v. Foreman, 55 Pa. 325.
Hadley v. Snevily, I W. & S. 477.
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH

v.

STEELE

Administration Bond-Surety's Liability When Not Signed by
Principal-Statute March 15, 1832-Bradley v. Com., 31 Pa.
522, Discussed
SUIT ON ADMINISTRATION BOND
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The administrator misappropriated $450, which the court accordingly ordered him to pay. He refused, and is in custody for contempt
of court. This action is against the surety, and the defense is, the administrator has not signed the bond, although his name appears as
principal obligor therein and the surety cannot be held.
Steckel for Plaintiff.
Strite for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
COYNE, J.-This case presents the interesting question, was the
bond, it not having been executed by the principal, valid for any purpose, and can those who signed it as sureties be held liable under it?
The Act of March 15, 1832, P. 14. 135, Sec. 24 provides for the issuance of administration bond and reads as follow:-It shall be the
duty of every register upon his granting any letters of administration
of the goods and chattels of any person dying intestate, to take a bond or
bonds, from the person or persons, receiving such letters, with two or
more sufficient sureties, respect being had to the value of the estate,
in the name of the commonwealth.
The statute does not explicitly state that the administrator shall
sign, but says, "to take a bond or bonds from the person receiving
letters of administration, with two or more sufficient sureties."
The plain meaning of this provision is that the principal and sureties must sign the bond before letters can be issued, for obviously there
can be no execution without signing.
A. & E. Cyc., Vol. 11, page 876. The signature of the principal is
necessary to give validity to the bond for any purpose, and until signed
by him it is not binding on the sureties, though they have signed it.
In City of Sacramento v. Dunlap, 14 Cal. 421, similar to the one at
bar, the action was upon a bond of the principal and sureties, but was
signed only by the sureties. The question for determination was
whether the intended principal or the sureties were bound by it.
It
was held that the plaintiff could not recover upon the bond. The liability of the sureties is conditional upon that of the principal. They are

170

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

bound if he is bound, and not otherwise. The very nature of the contract implies this. The fact that their signatures were placed to the
instrument can make no difference in its effect. It purports on its face
to be the bond of the three. Someone must have written his signature
first, but it is to be presumed upon the understanding that the others
named as obligors would add theirs. Not having done so, it was incomplete and without binding obligation upon either. Sharp v. U. S.,
4 Watts 21; Wood v. Washburn, 2 Pick. 24; Bean v. Parker and French,
17 Mass. 591; People v. Hartley, 21 Cal. 585; Weir v. Mead, 101 Cal. 125.
In Murfree on Official Bonds, Sec. 252, the law is thus stated, "A
bond purporting to be that of a principal and his sureties joint in form,
and only several is recited limitations of the liabilities of the sureties, is absolutely void if not executed by the principal. Being joint,
his signature was necessary to its validity, for the defects, which can
be cured upon their suggestion in the complaint do not embrace the
absence of the signature of the principal obligor. Without his signature the instrument is not his deed. There is no bond of his in which
defects can be suggested and cured.
The rule laid down in the case of Johnston v. Kimball, 39 Michigan
187, is similar to the one laid down in the California case supra.
In Bradley v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. 522, only one of the sureties
signed the bond, and it was held not to be an administration bond. In
such a case, by the very terms of the law, the letters of administration
are void, and the person acting under them became administrator de
son tort. McWilliams v. Hopkins, 4 Rawle 382; Sharp v. U. S., 4 Watts 21.
In Wood v. Washburn, 2 Pickering 24, Mass., it was held, where an
administration bond was not executed by the administrator, the sureties
were not liable.
The rule in Illinois is somewhat different, and is that if the sureties saw proper to bind themselves without the principal executing the
bond and becoming bound, we think they might do so, and their undertaking is one that may be enforced in the courts by an appropriate
action.
After a careful review of the authorities and the reasoning upon
which they are based, we think the better rule is that an official bond
in which the officer named as principal, has not executed it, is Prima
faaie invalid, and not binding upon the sureties.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The object of the 24th section of the Act of March 15th, 1832, 1
Stewart's Purdon, 1077, in requiring a bond from the administrator
with two sureties, is evident. The bond is not necessary to create an
obligation on the part of the administrator. He is acconntable to the
Orphans' Court, and for any failure of duty, that court adjudges him
liable, and defines the extent of his liability. The decree of that court
will sustain an execution against his real or personal property. In
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addition, if he fails to pay the money in respect to which he is in default, he is liable to attachment, that is, to imprisonment for an indefinite time, and to fine. The bond adds nothing therefor to the security
of the persons who are interested in the estate, whether creditors or
next of kin of the deceased. -The aim of the statute was to increase
their security by requiring two other solvent persons to pledge their
estates for the faithful performance of his duties by the administrator.
The statute directs the Register to "take a bond or bonds from the
person or persons receiving such letters [i. e., of administration] with
two or more sufficient sureties." The bond in this case was, we may
presume, taken from the administrator. It was a bond "with two"
sureties. It complies with the letter of the law. It also complies with
its spirit. Its purpose is to provide the security of the estates of three
persons, at least, for the proper discharge of the administrator's duties.
When the administrator tendered the bond to the Register, he provided
this security. The estate of the dead is as fully protected, and essentially, in the same way protected, as it would have been, had the name
of the administrator been appended to the bond.
The learned court below thinks that the letters were void, and
therefor that there is no liability of the sureties. It has been said that
a bond without two sureties is void. McWilliams v. Hopkins, 4 R. 382.
Indeed, the 27th section of the Act of 1832 expressly declares that the
grant of letters without "having taken a bond and sureties in the manner herein before prescribed shall be void."
It does not logically follow that the single surety who procures the
issue of the letters is not responsible according to the terms of his bond,
for acts done by the administrator, until other letters are issued to
another. Having occasioned the entrusting of the apparent authority
to act as administrator to X, the surety ought to be liable, as he intended to be, for any misfeasances of X. Unfortunately, in Bradley v.
Commonwealth, 31 Pa. 522, Lowrie, C. J. commits himself and the
court to the position that a bond with but one surety is void, because
the letters issued on it are pronounced by the statute void. The voidness of the letters, he affirms, "is inconsistent with the attribution of
any validity to the bond." It surely would have been wiser to hold the
surety therein liable for inisfeasances which he was instrumental in
making possible in procuring the grant of the letters, while holding
that for the purpose of making valid acts done by the administrator, the
bond and the letters should be null.
In Bradley v. Commonwealth, the writer of the opinion adverts to
the circumstance that "the bond was drawn for two [sureties] and only
one of them has signed it." Possibly the defendant who signed did so
with the expectation and on the condition that the other who was
named should also sign and the court may have thought that this condition not having been fulfilled, the signer was not liable. The discussion of the important questions involved occupies but a half dozen
lines and must be deemed unsatisfactory and inconclusive. It does not
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appear that the administrator's name was inserted in the bond as one
of the obligors. Even if it had been, his failure to sign does not withhold from the sureties the shelter of his primary liability.
We are aware that the decisions on the question before us are in
conflict. Many of them are discussed in a note found in 12 1. R. A. N.
S. 1105. In Star Grocer Co. v Bradford, 74 S. Z. 509, 39 14. R. A. N. S.
184, it is said that sureties in a bond are not released by omission of the
principal to execute it, if he is bound by law or a collateral contract, recited in the bond, for the performance of the duty recited in the condition thereof. We subscribe to this view.
It does not appear whether the bond was joint only, or was joint
and several. If it was joint only, we think the inference legitimate
that the sureties expected the administrator to sign it, and themselves
signed with the intention to be bound, only if and when he signed it.
We further think that the Register was bound to make the inference,
and to withhold the letters until the applicant for them, whose name
was in the bond as obligor, signed it. The annotator, in 12 L. R.
A. N. S. 1118, remarks, "There is little, if any, opposition to the dictum
that a bond joint only in forn must be signed by all the named obligors
to bind any of them." The plaintiff should have disclosed the nature
of the bond, so that we might know whether it was joint or joint and
several. As he hag not done so, we must assume it to be joint, and hold
that the sureties intended to bind themselves only if and when the obligor signed the bond. He has not signed it. They are therefore not
liable.
Judgment affirmed.
POLLARD v. HOGAN
Easement-Continuous Use-Tacking
ACTION QUARE CLAUSUM FREGIT

FACTS: Pollard owned a farm which lay between the highway
and a farm belonging to Hogan. Hogan's grantor had for 15 years
crossed Pollard's farm by a certain route to the highway whenever he
wished without obtaining the consent of Pollard. The Hogan farm
then became untenanted and so continued for 7 months, when being
sold to Hogan, who entered into possession, he recommenced the use
of the route. He had continued to use it for 6 years, when he was notified to use it no more. Hogan disobeyed the warning, and Pollard
brings this action.
Davis for Plaintiff.
Fanseen for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
EVANS, J. In Pennsylvania, by twenty-one years of open notorious, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted use of an easement on
another's land, one acquires the right to continue this use. The law is
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said to imply a grant. Leewellyn v. Buechley, 198 Pa. 642. Kearney
v. Borough of West Chester, 199 Pa. 392.
"It is not necessary that the owner of the land, who as such claims
a right of way, should himself have occupied that land and used the
way for the prescriptive period. The user of his grantor, Akeson v.
Patterson, (29 Pa. 22), devisor Garrett v. Jackson, (20 Pa. 331), ancestor Pierce v. Cloud, (42 Pa. 102), or in general any from whom he derived the land may be tacked to his own." Trickett'sa Law of Limitations in Pa., page 169.
.Thus it is seen that .Hogan holds the same right as his grantor
would have held and the question before us is whether or not the owner
of the land, by removing from the land, and leaving the way unused for
seven months, has done such an act as constitutes an abandonment
and bars the right of tacking the two prescriptivelperiods of fifteen and
six years.
It is held that by "continuous use" is not meant'.use .every day or
every week but whenever one pleases, apparently for all his needs and
purposes. Reimer v. Stuber, 20 Pa. 458, Akeson v. Patterson, 29 Pa.
22. The user must be in such a position that he may need the way
from time to time. As soon as the cause for use has been removed and
the way abandoned, no re-commencement could allow the tacking of
periods. Sailor v. Hertzoy, 4 Wharton, 272.
The question in this case is one of intention and the time is 9 ot a
necessary element. The cessation to use, accompanied by an act clearly indicating the intention to abandon the use, created, without reference to time, an abandonment.
However, had it been proved that his absence was merely temporary,
this would have been admissible to prove that no abandonment was
intended. Then the element of time would have entered and it is
doubtful whether seven months would have been sufficient to lead the
plaintiff to believe the way abandoned.
We therefore conclude that the defendant had no easement in this
land and having disobeyed the order to cease using the way, is liable to
this action.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUP4RIOR COURT
Hogan's use of the way across Pollard's farm for 21 years, would
have been deemed adverse to Pollard, in the absence of any evidence as
to its adverseness. Steffy v. Carpenter, 37 Pa. 41; Garrett v. Jackson,
20 Pa. 333; BDsling v. Williams, 10 Pa. 126. It appears however that
the use occurred whenever Hogan or his successor wished and without
obtaining Pollard's consent. It is not necessary, in order to make
such use effectual to create a right to continue to use the way in perpetuity, that it should appear that Hogan believed that he had a right
to use the way. The remark to the contrary, in ]Dsling v. Williams, 10
Pa. 126, is hardly sound.
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The only question that must be considered here, is, does the cessation of the use of the way for 7 months, prevent the tacking of the use
that followed to the use that preceded that period? The use of a way is
necessarily intermittent. The way may be traveled once a week, or
once in two or three weeks, and if it is thus traveled over a period of 21
years, a right may be created to continue the use of the way. Perhaps
a cessation for seven months would be too long, unless exceptional circumstances occurred which would account for it without supposing the
abandonment of the intention of the owner of the dominant land to continue the use. Hogan's grantor had been in possession of the land, and
had used the way. He then moved off and failed for 7 months to find one
who, either as tenant or as purchaser, would enter upon the land.
Since no one was occupying the farm, there was no occasion to use the
way. The suspension of the use was fully accounted for without the
hypothesis that Hogan's grantor had no purpose that his tenant or
grantee should continue the use. Pollard knew that Hogan's grantor
had used the way for 15 years. He knew that the use of the way was
interrupted because there was no occupant of the back farm. He knew
that Hogan had taken up the use and was continuing it. We think he
should have perceived that Hogan was continuing the use of the way
with an intention to avail himself of the earlier use of it by his
grantor.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff cites Pollard v. Barnes, 2
Cush. 191. The easement in that case was the right of a saw mill owner to have logs brought to his mill to be sawed, deposited on X's lot.
This lot had been thus used from 1822 to 1846, except the years 1829 to
1834. Wilde, J., says "The evidence tended to show a total cessation
of the enjoyment of the easement, and that for a long time, and the
owner had good reason to believe that the claim had been abandoned,
and if so, it seems immaterial whether the plaintiff had in fact abandoned his claim or not." But in the case before us, there was no sufficient reason to infer an abandonment of the claim. The cessation of
use was abundantly accounted for otherwise.
Hence we are of opinion that a right has been acquired by Hogan
to continue the use of the way. In so using it, he was guilty of no
trespass. The judgment should therefore have been for the defendant.
WILLIAM BOWEN v. AMOS HILL
Sale of Personal Property-Representation-Warranty-Condition-Intention of Parties to Govern-Caveat Emptor-Remedies
of Injured Party
IN

ASSUMPSIT

STATMENT OF FACTS
Bowen bought a horse of Hill, saying that he did not want it, unless
he could use it as a dray horse. Hill said that he had had the horse for
a year and that it was sound, strong and able to do any kind of work.
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Bowen replying that he would take the horse if it was as represented,
paid the price, $250.00, but in using the horse discovered that he was
unable to do the hauling. After a week's trial he tendered the horse back
and demanded the $250.00.
Routh for Plaintiff.
Burd for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HOCH, J. The counsel for the defendant has based the greater part
of his argument upon the assumption that this is a contract of warranty
and as such the plaintiff is not able to rescind the sale, since there was
no condition of return in the contract, but must sue for damages for
the breach of warranty.
A warranty is not one of the essential elements of a sale but is a
collateral undertaking. 35 Cyc. 366. In the case of executed contracts of
personal property, the articles are ordinarily sold upon inspection and
the sale is completed by a delivery of the property made at the time of
sale. To this class of cases, and especially horse sales, the rule of caveat
emptor is properly applicable. If a warranty is desired by thepurchaser
in such sales he must stipulatefor it before the sale is completed, otherwise he will be held to have bought upon his own judment of quality
and value of the thing purchased. Fogel v. Brubaker, 122 Pa. 14 ;Kase
v. Johns, 10 Watts 107; Freyman v. Kuecht, 78 Pa. 141.
The words "sound strong and able to do any kind of work," even tho
relied upon by Bowen in buying the horse, do not warrant the conclusion
that there exists an express warranty. A warranty implies a promise or
undertaking "to insure that certain facts are or shall be as he then represents them," 35 Cyc. 367. These words, considered in the light of a
warranty, are mere commendatory expressions involving no intention by
the vendor of being bound by their truth. The sale took place upon the
condition "if the horse was as represented." There is no intention to
"insure" the truth of any facts, but there seems to be an intention that
if the horse is not as represented it may be returned. If this were an executed sale the words could not suggest the idea of an implied warranty
because, in executed sales, there can be no implied warranty except that
of title; nor is there an implied warranty in any case where the sale is
made upon inspection by the buyer. Wilson v. Bellas, 23 Sup. 477, 1903.
We therefore conclude that this cannot properly be construed as a contract of warranty.
In Wolf v. Christman, 203 Pa. 476, the vendor stated to the vendee
that the ground beyond that paling was a part of the property and that
the entire depth of the lot was 90 feet. The vendee stated to the vendor
that it was necessary that he should have a lot of the depth named, because it was his intention to build a brewery adjoined to and in the rear
of a saloon which he proposed to open, otherwise he did not want it.
Here there was an appointment for an inspection but the court laid down
the doctrine that a positive statement by the vendor concerning a mat-
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ter of fact, as distinguished from a matter of opinion or a promise, if
intended to be relied upon by the purchaser, and in fact relied upon by
him, will generally prevent the application of the doctrine of caveat
emptor. The vendee was allowed to rescind the contract and recover
the money paid.
Caveat emptor only requires the exercise of such care and attention
as is exercised by ordinarily prudent men in like business affairs, and
only applies to defects which are open and patent to the senses. 39 Cyc.
1278. We do not believe the rule caveat emptor has any force in the
case at bar.
Concede, for the sake of argument, that this was a mistake of the
parties which resulted from the fault of neither, yet it was so essential,
so material and substantial that it can be reasonably inferred that, but
for the misdescription they would never have entered into the contract.
The horse subsequently proved of no use to Bowen since it could not be
used as a dray horse. Under the peculiar and special facts in this case,
we consider the magnitude of the injury such that Bowen should have
the relief sought for. It would not be just or equitable to compel him
to keep that which he said, at the time of sale, he did not want, and in
fact, did not contract for, and allow as his only remedy damages for the
breach.
A contract must be construed so as to include not only what the
parties actually wrote down or said, but also all those things which the
law implies as a part of it, and likewise all matters which the parties
intended to but did not express. The primary consideration is one of
intention. The agreement is what the party intended to make. If the
intention is manifested clearly and unequivocally, it controls. What
was the intention of the parties is a question for the jury to determine
under proper instructions from the court. 24 Am. & Xng., Cyc. 1041;
Gonsor v. Smith, 115 Pa. 452. Where the contract of sale is in lawful
form, the vesting of title depends upon the intention of the parties to be
derived from the contract and its circumstances. Winslow v. Leonard,
24 Pa. 14.
The principle, that so long as anything remains to be done to ascertain the price, quantity or quality of the thing sold, the title does
not pass, .has its origin almost entirely in the sense of justice that protects unpaid vendors against the fraud or failure of their vendees, and
very slight circumstances showing any remaining control in the vendor will be allowed to prevail in such cases. The meaning is that so
long as any of these things remain to be done, an unpaid vendor who
is in danger of losing the price, may rescind the sale. 8 F ast. 614; 12
Id. 614; Young v. Austin, 6 Pick. 280; Riddle v. Varnum, 20 Id. 280; 2
M. & Sel. 397. The same sense:of justice operates in favor of a purchaser who has paid and thus reverses the result where the other circumstances are the same. Macomber v. Parker, 13 Pick. 175; Wilkes
& rontaine v. Ferris, 5 Jonns 335; Smith v. Craig, 3 W. & Sec. 14; Winslow v. Leonard, 24 Pa. 14.
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At the time of making the contract Bowen said, "he did not want
the horse unless he could use it as a dray horse." Hill assured Bowen
that it could do "any kind of work," expressly stating that the horse
was "strong" and thereby implying that it could do dray work. The
question arises are the words "anykind of wbrk" express-and do they contain enough to include "dray work?" It is evident that Hill, knowing the
purpose for which Bowen wished to use the horse, impliedly, if not
tacitly, asserted that the horse was able to do dray work. When Bowen
said "he would take the horse iv it was as represented," Hill, in executing the contract of sale, implidly at least, contracted that ir the
horse was not as represented he could return it and get his moneyThe word "if," as used in this.contract, we think defines the status of
the parties, and, as defined by the Standard Dictionary, is "the typical
conditional particle." No betterword to express a condition could have
been used. The execution of the contract by Hill assures Bowen of the
affirmation of the conditioniupon which he will buy. In executing such
a contract Hill further, impliedly at least, assented to the use of the
horse by Bowen for a reasonable time to discover whether the horse
could be used as a dray horse. The assumption in such case is that the
contract was not an absolute one at the time when the money was
paid over for the horse, but that it was a contract conditioned upon the
fitness of the horse for the particular purpose for which he wanted it.
The implication is that these words were part of the terms of the contract; otherwise the contract would not have been executed.
In Rohn v. Dennis, 109 Pa. 504, D agreed upon a Saturday to buy
two horses from Rprovided they were as recommended by R and would
suit D for farming purposes. D took the horses and paid $155 cash and a
colt, which D was to keep for R until the following Wednesday. R sent
for the colt on the following Thursday and D refused to give it up and
on the following day notified R that the horses did not suit him and
that he should
rome and take them away. R brought replevin for the
colt. The jury found for the defendant, on the ground that they under
stood the "terms," the "acts of the parties" and the circumstances of
the contract to be that there was no absolute sale of the horses to D unless they were as represented and that the sale took place conditionally;
that they regarded six days a reasonable time to discover whether or
not the horses were satisfactory and as represented by R.
Applying the principles of law as laid down in this opinion to the
facts of this case, we believe, that if the jury should find that Hill's
representations were untrue, that if the horse could not be used as a
dray horse, and if.one week can be considered a reasonable time to
to discover whether the horse is suitable for dray work, Bowen is entitled to say that he would not keep the horse and should recover the
sum paid for it. It is immaterial whether Hill knew that his representations were untrue. They were probably made in good faith as we
believe he impliedly assumed that Bowen should have a reasonable time
to ascertain the truth before, the contract would become absolute. Verdict for plaintiff accordingly.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
Whether the subsequent demonstration of the falsity of the seller's
statement that the horse was sound, strong and able to do any kind of
work, gave the buyer the right to rescind the contract and recover the
purchase price, depends upon whether the statement was (1) a representation or (2) a warranty or (3) a condition.
(1) A representation is a statement or assertion made by one party
to another, before or at the time of making the contract, of some matter
or circumstance relating to the contract, but which is not an integral
part of the contract. The subsequently demonstrated falsity of a representation does not justify the rescission of a contract induced thereby
unless the representation was made with knowledge of its falsity.
E shleman v. Lightner, 169 Pa. 48; Wilkinson v. Stettler, 46 Super Ct.
407, 35 Cyc. 63, 9 Cyc. 408. Clark on contracts 210. Considering the
statement of the vendor as a mere representation we would be compelled to find for the defendant because there is no evicence that the vendor knew that his statement was false.
(2) A warranty is an independent, subsidiary contract for the existence or truth of some fact relating to the thing which is the subject of
the sale. Clark on Contracts 212. In Pennsylvania it has been uniformly held that, in absence of fraud or an agreement giving the buyer
the right to rescind, he cannot rescind an executed contract of sale because of a breach of warranty. Prey v. Knecht, 78 Pa. 141; 33 Cyc. 138.
Considering the statement as a warranty, we would be compelled to find
for the defendant, because there was no evidence of fraud or of any
agreement providing for a return.
(3) A condition is a statement or promise which forms the basis of
the contract. Clark on Contracts 212, 35 Cyc. 368; Pope v. Allis, 115 U. S.
363. The untruth of a statement which is a condition discharges the
contract. Clark on Contracts 212, 464, Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S.
188. Benjamen on Sales, 352. Considering the statement of the seller
as a condition, we would be compelled to find for the plaintiff as the
condition has not been fullfilled.
Whether a statement is a condition or a mererepresentation presents a
nice and difficult question which is to be determined by ascertaining the
intention of the parties by the application of common sense to each
particular case.
In contracts for the sale of a specific chattel upon inspection, the
Pennsylvania courts have taken an extreme position in applying the doctrine of caveat emptor, but we have been able to discover no case in
whioh it has been held that the parties may not expressly make the contract conditional upon the truth of a certain fact in relation to the subject matter of the sale.
In this case we believe that the contract for the sale of the horse
was expressly made upon the condition that the horse was sound, strong
and able to do any kind of work and that, this condition not having been
fulfilled, the buyer was entitled to rescind the contract.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

179

We believe that it was the intention of the buyer to make the soundness of the horse, etc., "the basis of the contract," that his intention was
sufficiently expressed in his offer to buy the horse, and that the seller in
accepting the buyer's offer, nec-essarily agreed and assented to the condition.
The parties did not contract for the sale of a specific horse whatever
its character might turn out to be, but for a specific horse provided it
possessed certain qualities, and whether or not the horse possessed those
qualities could be ascertained by trial only, and not by inspection. The
seller agreed to furnish and the buyer agreed to take not simply a horse,
or the horse before the parties, but the horse before the parties "if it
possessed certain qualities."
Bannerman v. White, 10 C. B. N. S. 860 closely resembles the case
at bar. The contract was for the sale of a year's crop of hops. The
buyer asked the seller if any sulphur had been used in the treatment of
that year's crop. The seller replied, "no."
The buyer said he would
not even ask the price if sulphur had been used. After this the parties
discussed the price and the buyer agreed to purchase. He afterwards
repudiated the contract on the ground that sulphur had been used. The
statement of the seller was proven to be false, but not wilfully false.
The court said, "The defendant required and the plaintiff gave his
undertaking that no sulphur had been used. This undertaking was a
preliminary stipulation and if it had not been given, the defendant
would not have gone on with the treaty which resulted in the contract of
sale. In this sense it was the condition upon which the defendant contracted, and it would be contrary to the intention expressed by the stipulation if the contract should remain valid if sulphur had been used."
In the case quoted the buyer substantially said that he would buy
if sulphur had not been used; in this case he said that he would buy if
the horse was sound; in both cases the seller said nothing after the remarks of the buyer; in the case quoted the seller had previously said
that no sulphur had been used; in this case the seller had previously
said that the horse was sound.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

B

v.

C. BANK

Bank's Liability to a Holder of a Check-Acceptance-Act May.
10, 1 8 Sl4 P. S. 17-Act May 16, 1901, P. L. 194, Sec. 89
IN

ASSUMPSIT

. FACTS
A gave B a check on C. Bank. The check was protested by the C.
Bank on account of "not sufficient funds." Two days later the C. Bank
admitted to B that A then had sufficient funds in bank to pay the
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check, and B presented the check for payment. Payment was refused
by the bank on the ground that the check had been protested. There
were no marks on the check to show that it had been protested. Before
B could procure another check from A, A became insolvent. This
is an action by B against the C. Bank for the amount of the check.
Burd for Plaintiff.
Hoch for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT BELOW
W4STOVAR, J.-Although the rule in many States is, that the
holder of a check has a right of action against the bank for the amount
thereof, when the bank refuses to pay, having sufficient funds of the
drawer, the rule in Pennsylvania, as laid down by many decisions, is,
that the holder does not have a right of action. This rule has been
stated in Bank v. Shoemaker, 117 Pa. 94; Maguire v. Bank, 131 Pa. 362;
Saylor v. Bushing, 100 Pa. 23; Bank v. McMichael, 106 Pa. 460; Johnston v. Bank, 101 Pa. 597.
In Saylor v. Bushing, 101 Pa. 597, the court said, "It may be regarded
as settled, that the holderof a check cannot maintain an action in his own
name against the drawees, though they have sufficient funds of
Prior to acceptance, it is said,
the drawer, if they refuse to accept it."
there is no privity between the holder and the bank, and, therefore, the
holder cannot maintain the action.
Act of May 16, 1901, P. L. 194, Sect. 89, expressly states that "a
check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the
funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is
not liable to the holder until it accepts the check or certifies the check.
The bank in this case then is not liable to plaintiff unless it has in
some manner accepted the check.
The bank in the first instance refused payment of the check on account of "not sufficient funds." The check was protested and returned
Two days later the bank admitted to B that A then had sufficient
to B.
funds to pay the check. Can this admission be an acceptance on the
part of the bank? We think it certainly was not.
In Bank v. McMichael, supra, it was contended on behalf of bank
that the only modes of acceptance which would bind the bank by a legal
obligation to the holder, are a certification of the check or charging it
to the account of drawer. The court held that those were not the only
methods, and that the acceptance could be made by express acceptance
in words and also a retention of the check and a positive promise to pay
it.
The court did not go so far as to say that a mere admission that
funds were in the bank, after having refused to pay a check, would
amount to an acceptance.
A bank account, subject to check, is continually changing. The
bank never knows how many checks are outstanding. A bank may admit to many holders of checks that at a certain time there was enough
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to pay their checks, but in the meantime other checks might come in
and exhaust the fund. To hold that such admission would amount to
an acceptance on part of the bank would be unreasonable. Banks
should pay checks as they are presented, and unless there has been an
express agreement, or its equal, that the bank would make provision
for the check, it cannot be held liable by the holder.
If the bank did not accept the check, so far as the holder is concerned, it makes no difference on what ground the bank refused to pay
the check. The fact that the bank refused to pay the check on the
ground that it had been protested, does not enter into the matter, because the bank had at no time accepted the check.
We are not entirely satisfied that the Pennsylvania rule is the
better, but until it is changed the holder has no right of action.
Judgment for Defendant Bank.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The bank was clearly under no duty to pay the check when it was
first presented, if, as we must, we assume that the allegation of the
bank that the drawer of the check had "not sufficient funds" in the
bank to cover the check, was true. The bank owes no duty, even to its
customer, to pay his checks, unless he has with it a sufficient deposit.
Even if the fact alleged by the bank did not exist, even if the
drawer of the check had an ample depusit in the bank at the time of
the presentment of the check for payment, the bank, though it owed a
duty to the drawer to pay the check owed no such duty to the holder of
the check. Its relation to the drawer, as depository to depositor,
created no duty toward persons to whom the latter directed it to make
payments. First Nat. Bank v. Shoemaker, 117 Pa. 94; Saylor v. Bushing, 100 Pa. 23; Clark v. Savings Bank, 31 Super. 647; 2 P. & 14. Dig.,
Dec. 2842.
The bank's liability to the holder of the check when it exists,
arises from its acceptance of the check. Croyle v. Guelich, 35 Super.
356. Its refusal to pay the check, for whatever reasons, true or untrue,
could hardly be twisted into an acceptance. Had the second presentment of the check not been made, it could with no plausibility be contended that the bank had accepted.
The Act of May 10th, 1881, P. L. 17, forbids holding any as an acceptor on a bill, draft or order for the payment of money exceeding $20,
unless the acceptance is in writing. It does not appear for what
amount the check involved in the case before us was drawn. The Negotiable Instruments, Act of 1901, however, declares that "The acceptance [of a bill] must be in writing and signed by the drawee." The
only exception to the requirement is the provision that when the
drawee of a bill destroys it, after it has been presented to him for acceptance, or refuses within 24 hours to return it accepted or unaccepte d
to the holder, he shall be deemed to have accepted it. The Act of 1901
direct&that the provisions thereof applicable to a bill of exphange pay-
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able on demand, except as otherwise directed, shall apply to a check.
With respect to acceptance there is no direction "otherwise." The acceptance of a check for any amount, therefore, must be written.
The admission, even if it had been in writing, on the second presentment of the check, that the bank then had sufficient funds of the
drawer, could not be construed into an acceptance. It was accompanied by a refusal to pay, and the assignment of a reason for said refusal.
Moreover it was not in writing, nor was it signed by the bank.
It is not necessary to discuss the excuse of the bank for not paying
the check on its second presentment. Possibly it incurred no liability
to the depositor, on account of some rule of which he was cognizant,
that checks once presented and of which payment was justifiably refused, should not subsequently be deemed a valid order on the bank.
Such a rule, if it existed, would seem to be somewhat foolish. For the
bank the function of the check is be a warrant to it, as against 'its depositor, to pay out moneys on his account. The depositor should not
have issued a check, unless he had good reason to believe that his funds
in the bank would be ample, when it should be presented, to pay it, or
that tle bank would in any case pay it, even though it should be an
overdraft, but if he actually issued a check when neither his deposit nor
his other relations with the bank justified the expectation that the bank
would pay it, that check would be an authority to the bank to pay it,
whether it had been previously presented and payment of it had been
declined or not. The check bore no tokens on it of having been previously presented. It was genuine. It was supported, we must assume, by an adequate consideration. Nothing had occurredisince the
first presentment of the check to justify or to require the bank's suspicion that to pay it, after the depositor was in funds, would be to dispense his money as he did not wish it to be dispensed. Good neighborliness required though, unfortunately, the law did not require, that the
bank should pay the holder of the check who presented it, while the
drawer had funds sufficient to meet it.
The clear and satisfactory opinion of the learned court below sustains its judgment, which, therefore, must be affirmed.

WM. POTTER v. HARRY HOPEWELL
Promissory Note-Liability of Surety-Alteration-Ratifieation
IN

ASSUMPSIT

STATEMF4NT OF FACTS
Stover executed a note for $500.00 payable in six months, to Potter
with Hopewell as security. Two days later, Potter thinking the time
too long, Stover changed the time of payment from "six months after
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date" to "two months." Two weeks thereafter Potter shows the note
thus changed to Hopewell, who said, "That's all right; I agree to the
change." He is now sued and sets up the defense of alteration. He
received no consideration for this assent to the alteration.
Renard for Plaintiff.
Sharp for Defendant.
OPINION OF TH,

COURT

O'RORKE, J.-It
is not clear from the statement of facts whether
the note in this case was negotiable or non-negotiable. However it is
not material to the decision reached in this opinion.
There can be no doubt that a change in the time of payment in a
note is ordinarily a material alteration. Such a change is expressly
enumerated among "material alterations" in Sec. 125 of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments act; and this is so whether the running time
of payment is shortened or lengthened. Vol. III Randolph on Commercial Paper, page 2485, § 1758. And while the rule is declared to be more
stringent in regard to negotiable notes (Neff v. Horner, 63 Pa. 327),
such alterations have been held quite as serious in non-negotiable
paper; and there seems to be no good reason for the distinction. Bolles,
Pa. Law of Negotiable and Non-Negotiable Instruments, P. 73.
The mere fact of a material alteration does not avoid an instrument; (Kountz v. Kennedy, 63 Pa. 187), there is no effective test as to
what alterations will; each case must stand more upon its own facts
than on the rule announced in any case. Kounts v. Kennedy (above);
Craighead v. Maloney, 99 Pa. 211; Citizen's Bank v. Williams, 174 Pa.
66. But assuming that this particular alteration, if made in a deceptive and fraudulent manner, would be a defense, let us determine
whether it was, in this case, such a material alteration as would, under
these circumstances, be a defense for non-payment of the note.
In this case the maker, Stover, after executing the note to Potter,
made a material alteration without notice to the security; Hopewell
subsequently agreed to the change however, receiving no consideration
for this assent.
An alteration made with the assent of the parties affected is, of
course, immaterial. Neff v. Horner, 63 Pa. 327; Barrington v. Bank,
14 S & R 405. But this change was made without the assent of Hopewell, the indorser; he did not assent to the change until two weeks after
it was made. The chief question here then is whether this ratification
of the change, given after the alteration was made, was such an assent
as would estop an indorser from setting up alteration as a defense.
There appears to have been no fraud in the transaction; Stover notified
Hopewell; and he was satisfied to let his liability continue on the
changed note. There can be no doubt that evidence of Hopewell's
assent was admissible to establish his liability. Graham v. Spang, 1
Mona. (Pa.) 167; Myers v. Nell, 84 Pa. 369, holds that "An addition to
a promissory note, if afterwardassented to by a drawer is imimaterial."

184

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

Parol evidence is admissible to show consent to an alteration-Myers
v. Nell, 84 Pa. 369; 2 A & E. Encyc. 181. A surety on a note is bound
to the full extent of his principal's liability (P & R. R 3R. v. McKnight,
124 Pa. 8) and is subject to all principles that apply to the maker or
drawer. In an action on a note, an accommodation endorser is regarded in a general sense as a joint maker, and makes the indebtedness his
own. Bolles Pa. Law of Negotiable and Non-Negotiable Instruments,
P. 79; Amsbaugh v. Gearhart & Co., 11 Pa. 482 and Trust Co. v. Haser,
199 Pa. 17.
The strict English rule that every alteration renders the instrument
void has not been adhered to here. It is settled by the great weight of
American anthority that an alteration assented to by an indorser will
bind him for liability on a note; such ratification constituting a waiver
of the discharge otherwise operated by the alteration. Wilson v. Jamieson, 7 Pa. 126; Miller v. Stark, 148 Pa. 164. And it is generally conceded that an act which may be assented to irt limine may be effectually
ratified after it has been performed, and e converso. Commercial Bank
of Buffalo v. Warren, 15 N. Y. 577; Bank v. Gay, 63 Mo. 33. In Kennedy v. Lancaster Co. Bank, 18 Pa. 347, it is held, "in order to recover
it is necessary to show that the alteration was assented to." In Kilkelly v. Martin, 34 Wis. 525, it is held; "As to instruments not under
seal the assent of a party to an alteration already made has the same
effect as an original grant of authority to make such alterations; .........
we find no disagreement among the authorities on this." King v.
Bush, 36 Ill. 142. In King v. Hunt, 13 Mo. 68 (No. 97), a case strictly
analogous to the one at bar, a recovery was had by the payee from the
indorser. It is certain that an alteration such as is shown here may
be ratified by an innocent party affected by it, so as to bind him, to all
intents and purposes, as if he had fully authorized it in the first instance. Stewart v. 1st Natl. Bank, 40 Mich. 348; Bank v. Warren, 15
Ny. 577; Montgomery v. Crosthwait, 90 Ala. 533; (7 Pa. 126 ante-cited)
14 P. & L. digest of Decisions 23725-1167.
Whether a new consideration is essential to support the contract
thus made by ratification is a somewhat mooted question; but, excepting
Kentucky and Minnesota, nearly every, if not every other state sustains
the doctrine that a new consideration is not necessary. Prouty v. Williams 123 Miss. 297; Pelton v. Prescott 13 Ia. 567; Cravens v. Gillian,
63 Mo. 28. In the opinion in Bank v. Gay, 63 Mo. 33 tP. 40) it was said that
"The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has uniformaly held that there
could be no ratification without a new consideration where the original
act was mala fide," and McHugh v. County, 67 Pa. 391, is cited in support of that doctrine, which the supreme court of Missouri regards as
unsound. We think that case does not apply here, where the original
contract was not malafide, there being no apparent fraudulent intent
or purpose whatever. But, even if there had been fraud in this case,
we believe that neither McHugh v. County (above) nor Negley v. Linsday, 67 Pa. 217 can now bd regarded as expressing the Pennsylvania doc-
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trine. Nor can Vandyke v. Shisler, 92 Pa. 44 (where the ground of the decision was the actual fraud,) nor 8 M. & S. 486, nor Glen v. Glen, 4 S. & R.
487. "These cases," according to Pearsoll v. Chapin, 8 Wright (44Pa.) "go
beyond the ordinary rule and can not be sustained." In Pearsoll v.
Chapin supra, it was held that a ratification is in general the adoption
of a previously joined contract; notwithstanding a vice that rendered it
relatively void and a contract absolutely void on account of fraud on a
party may be ratified or confirmed without a new contract or new consideration now in Pennsylvania. 12 L. R. A. 140; Negley v. Linsday,
17 Smith (67 Pa.) 217; Miller v. Stark, 148 Pa. 164; Stahl v. Berger, 10 S
& R. 170; Prouty v. Wilson, 123 Mass, 297.
We think the law of Pennsylvania now allows confirmation of all
alterations in contracts without consideration even although they were
made fraudulently; and certainly where they were not made fraudulently and notice was given to all the parties affected. The element of
reasonableness in giving notice is uncertain; no time limits are specified
in this state or elsewhere, and each case must be decided according to
its merits. We think in the present case the notice was given soon
enough; the willingness of the indorser to ratify the change strongly
evidenced that fact.
There have been many refinements about the doctrine of ratification;
refinements which savor more of subtlety than of sound judgment,
as was said in Bank v. Gay, 63 Mo. 33 cited ante. With some exceptions the proposition is undoubtedly correct that "he who may authorize
in the beginning, may ratify in the end." There is no force to the argument.that there must be a new consideration to validate a confirmatory act. There is no reason why independent consideration should be
required more on subsequent sanction than on original consent. "Nemo
videtur fraudare eos qui sciunt et consentiunt," and, on principle, the
Supreme Court of Missouri should be upheld in its views. Judgment is
therefore entered for Plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The court below after a careful scrutiny which seens by no means
to have been confined to the briefs of the counsel has decided
in favor of the plaintiff. In this judgment we concur. The great
weight of authority supports the doctrine that any one of the parties to
an instrument who may have become discharged because of an alteration
therein may ratify the unauthorized act, so as to make himself liable
without any new consideration, upon the principle that he who may
authorize in the beginning may ratify in the end. 2 Cyc. 172, 2 Am. &
Sng. Ancy. 259, 3 Encyc. L. & R. 449, 39 L. R. A. V. S. 131.
Affirmed.
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BOOK REVIEW
Practice in the Courts of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania
By JOHN W. PATTON and HENRY B. PATTON, both of the
Philaclelphia Bar. T. & J. W. JOHNSON Co., Philadelphia.
This is a very well written and a very useful book. It does not attempt to exhibit the notes of practice in all the courts, nor does it profess to touch upon all subjects embraced within the jurisdiction of the
court of Common Pleas. It nevertheless gives a very valuable outline
of the practice concerning a large variety of proceedings; concerning
the usual common law actions, sheriff's interpleader, depositions, affidavits of defense, proceedings on mortgages, opening and striking off
judgments, mechanics liens, attachments, divorce, trials, mandamus,
execution, appeals, and several other subjects. The information is
presented in a very readable form. The principal writer of the two
whose names appear on the title page, was for a considerable time
lecturer on practice in the law school of the University of Pennsylvania, and much of the material which he then collected and arranged
for the students, he has organized into this book. A somewhat careful examination of the work convinces us that it will prove very serviceable, not merely to students but to practitioners.

